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WHEN CONGRESS ACTS:
JUDICIAL PROCEDURAL INNOVATION
AND THE PSLRA
Briana Lynn Rosenbaum*
In her Essay, Fact or Fiction: Flawed Approaches to Evaluating Market
Behavior in Securities Litigation,1 Prof. Lipton describes a judiciary locked in
an ongoing struggle to shape the private securities fraud remedy in the
class action context. In her Essay, Prof. Lipton focuses on, and laments,
the evidentiary presumptions that courts have created to “ensure that . . .
investors would have a remedy—and that markets would not be left
vulnerable to manipulation.”2
Prof. Lipton explains that these
presumptions, designed to simplify a complex body of substantive law and
related evidence, also result in “near-arbitrary” class certification decisions
in the securities litigation context.3 In this Comment, I use these
presumptions as inspiration for an inquiry into effects that the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) specifically, and Congressional
procedural rulemaking more generally, have had on the procedural
rulemaking choices of the Supreme Court.
Like Prof. Lipton, I too see a conflicted judiciary in the securities
litigation context. On the one hand, the PSLRA sharply limits the class
action device in the securities context.4 As compared to general class
action practice, class actions in the securities context are subject to
increased oversight, heightened pleading standards, and more restrictive
discovery. On the other hand, the PSLRA also expressly creates a right to
enforce securities fraud violations through aggregate litigation. Thus,
*

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. Thank you to the
organizers of the Business Law: Connecting the Threads Conference who provided the
opportunity for me to explore the ideas in this Comment and to Savannah Darnall for
excellent research assistance.

Ann M. Lipton, Fact or Fiction: Flawed Approaches to Evaluating Market Behavior in Securities
Litigation, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 741 (2019).
1

2

Id. at 744

3

Id.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (2000). In 1998, Congress limited the securities class action
still further by preempting most state securities class actions through Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
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courts are left to harmonize two potentially conflicting aims: the
resolution of complex merits issues involved in Section 10(b) fraud claims,
and the application of class actions procedures that necessarily require
some kind of generalization, simplification, or aggregation of data.
The result, according to Prof. Lipton, is grim. Prof. Lipton
describes a judiciary that is stymied in the development of law that should
guide courts’ decisions regarding class certification. For example, she
explains that the fraud-on-the-market presumption, which allows a
plaintiff to meet the reliance element for an entire class action merely by
showing that markets were running efficiently at the time of a
misrepresentation, has no grounding in an empirical understanding of
how markets work, and is often unprovable.5 Nevertheless, these
presumptions also make it easier to bring class actions. As she argues,
presumptions unique to securities doctrine “smooth out the most
significant differences among class members,” and thus “facilitate the
aggregation of claims into a single class action.”6 Thus, “presumptions
translate what would otherwise be a series of individual questions about
investors’ reliance on the alleged fraud into a common question regarding
the fraud’s effect on the market.”7 This “transformation,” Prof. Lipton
explains, is what allows plaintiffs in securities class actions to meet the
requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) that common questions predominate over
individual ones.8
Despite this uncertainty (or, perhaps because of this uncertainty
some argue),9 securities class actions continue to thrive. In fact, securities
litigation is one of the few areas where class action litigation is still going

5

Lipton, supra note 1, at 744.

6

Id.

7

Id. at 766.

8

Id..

For critiques of class actions in the securities litigation context post-PSLRA, see, e.g.,
Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 627 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at
Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151 (2009); Lynn A. Stout, Type
I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711
(1996); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913 (2003).
9
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strong.10 It is also one of the few substance-specific areas where Congress
has enacted major procedural reform, specifically through the PSLRA.11
In most other areas, litigants are finding it harder to seek aggregate judicial
solutions for private harms. Thus, scholars have documented the
tightening of procedural mechanisms, ultimately resulting in narrowing
access to judicial processes, particularly in the context of aggregate
litigation.12 Examples include Supreme Court cases making motions to
dismiss harder to bring, class actions harder to certify, and waivers of class
actions easier to enforce.13 Thus, procedural scholars opine that we are in
an era of procedural retrenchment, resulting in decreased access to judicial
processes.
Although this retrenchment of judicial access is primarily thought
to be a result of judicial action, elsewhere, I argue that Congress plays a
significant role in litigation reform and procedural retrenchment.14 It does
so both through “major,” trans-substantive procedural reforms, like the
Class Action Fairness Act, and through targeted procedural reforms, such
as the PSLRA.15

See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND
FUTURE 132 (Harvard Univ Press 2015) (explaining that only federal securities laws are
“generally amenable to class action treatment,” although “even here the Court has
reinterpreted the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine to impose additional burdens on the
plaintiff ”); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729, 827
(2013) (listing securities fraud as an area were class actions “continue to thrive,” along
with wage and hour cases, Employee Retirement Income Security Act cases, and “to a
lesser extent,” antitrust cases).

10

11 Briana L. Rosenbaum, The Legislative Role in Procedural Rulemaking Through Incremental
Reform, 72 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019).
12

See id. at 103 (citing authorities).

13

See infra notes 37 through 39 and accompanying text (describing cases).

14

See Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 104-06.

Other examples of targeted reforms include Congressional legislation related to class
action cases involving immigrants, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 306(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3009-607, litigation filed by inmates, Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, & 42 U.S.C.), and employment
discrimination cases, see Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1777 (2003)
(describing legislation).
15
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Of Congress’s targeted reforms, the PSLRA’s reform of securities
litigation may be one of the most cited examples of Congressional interest
in the procedural rulemaking role.16 Congress’s express purpose was to
discourage abuses in securities litigation, including the filing of lawsuits
for the singular purpose of obtaining a settlement.17 To accomplish this,
Congress implemented a complex procedural and substantive reform
package. Key provisions include requiring plaintiffs to plead with
particularity when bringing claims based on misleading statements or
omissions and scienter, strengthening Rule 11 by requiring mandatory
findings at the final stage, and imposing a discovery stay during pre-trial
motions.18
The success of the PSLRA as a measure of litigation reform has
been much debated, with some calling it an outright failure, and others
noting cautious optimism.19 For the purpose of this Comment, though, I
will assume that Congress’s choice to implement targeted reforms like the
PSLRA has, as noted above, led to the limited development of law that
should guide courts’ class certification decisions. If this is so, it leaves one
to question how a Congressional choice to regulate procedure could lead
to lack of procedural innovation in the judiciary.
To be clear, I do not mean to question the direct effects that the
PSLRA has had on access to courts. Those direct limitations—such as the
Congress’s success in passing legislation expressly designed to curb seemingly
unmeritorious suits in the securities context stood in stark contrast to similarly
intended, but failed, legislative efforts in other areas. For example, the same year that
Congress passed the PSLRA, it failed to pass the Attorney Accountability Act of 1995,
which included trans-substantive amendments to Rule 11 similar those in the PSLRA,
including making sanctions mandatory for all cases. However, while Congress had the
political ability to tackle the perceived problem of frivolous litigation in a targeted
litigation environment, it could not do so for general litigation. Rosenbaum, supra note
12, at 148.

16

See Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)policing the Market: Congress's Flawed Approach to Securities
Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 73-76 (2006) (discussing the “distrust of litigation” that
drove the PSLRA).

17

18

See id. at 76-78; Rosenbaum, supra note 12, at 124–25 (and accompanying citations).

See sources cited supra note 10. See also Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 976 (2003) (conducting empirical
studies and concluding that, while there was no reduction in the rate of securities
litigation “there is statistically significant evidence suggesting that the PSLRA improved
overall case quality at least in the circuit that most strictly interprets the Reform Act's
heightened pleading standard”).

19
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heightened pleading requirement—are both clear and much debated.20
The focus instead is on indirect effects of the Congressional choice to
enact targeted procedural rules, particularly on the institutional procedural
rulemaking role of the judiciary. A useful, but imperfect, analogy is the
constitutional doctrine of field preemption. Under this doctrine, the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Supremacy Clause to bar state action
when a “scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.’”21 Under this theory of field preemption, the Court has
prohibited state action regarding regulation of ship vessels22 and of
immigration.23
Here, too, it is possible to see Congress’s decision to regulate
procedure in targeted areas, such as securities litigation through the
PSLRA, as “covering the field” of procedural rulemaking in that
substantive area. The effect here could be similar to that in field
preemption: it may be to prevent procedural rulemaking by the judiciary
in the same field. This would be so even if, like the states under the
preemption doctrine, the judiciary would normally have rulemaking power
in the area. Thus, the question still remains, has Congress’s choice to enact
legislation in the area of securities litigation affected the procedural rulemaking choices of the judiciary? There is some evidence that it has.
Prof. Lipton argues that, through cases like Basic, the Supreme
Court has “crafted ‘ham-fisted’ mechanisms for distinguishing meritorious
cases from frivolous ones.”24 Although she presents many reasons to
criticize these mechanisms, I will focus on her critique of their motives.
As noted above, the PSLRA was motivated, in large part, by a desire to
curb frivolous litigation.
But Prof. Lipton argues that judicial
presumptions in the securities context are, in fact, unable to distinguish
“meritorious cases from frivolous ones” and can “insulate even ‘dastardly’
frauds so long as defendants can manipulate their disclosures sufficiently

20

See, e.g., sources cited supra note 10, 20.

Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal quotation
marks and case citations omitted).

21

22

Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165–66 (1978).

23

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 73–74 (1941).

24

Lipton, supra note 1, at 772.
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to match doctrinal rigidities.”25 She paints a picture of a judiciary refusing
to make deliberate choices of “where to allocate the burden of uncertainty
for an injury” that is inherently uncertain and complex.26
The Court has declined to adopt some of the more obvious
solutions to curtailing perceived abuses in securities litigation on a number
of occasions. This, despite urging by parties and amici in multiple cases.
For example, in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“Hallliburton II”),
the Supreme Court rejected the request to reverse the fraud on the market
(and efficient markets) standard, citing the PSLRA.27 In doing so, the
Court explained that Congress, by enacting the PSLRA, had “responded”
to the frivolous litigation and efficiency concerns.28 Such legislative action
demonstrated for the Court not only the Congress had addressed the very
concerns raised, but also “Congress’s willingness” to do to.29 In short, the
Court said, take this up with Congress if you want to address frivolous
litigation in a different way.30
The Supreme Court said something similar in Amgen Inc. v.
Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds when it declined to change the Basic
presumption.31 The Court explained that Congress had enacted the
PSLRA specifically to prevent “abuse, including the ‘extract[ion]’ of
‘extortionate settlements’ of frivolous claims.”32 Congress “fortified the
25

Id.

26

Id.

27

573 U.S. 258, 277 (2014).

28

Id.

29

Id.

See Ann M. Lipton, Halliburton and the Dog That Didn't Bark, 10 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 25 (2015) (arguing that, since the Court in Halliburton II refused to
consider settlement pressure as a reason to change the Basic presumption, they also
should not “stand sentry” over the related the efficiency and price impact
determinations at the class certification stage).

30

31 568 U.S. 455, 475 (2013); COFFEE, supra note 11, at 130 (noting that, while Halliburton
II did not reject the Basic presumption, it did “tilt the playing field marginally in
defendant’s favor” by making the presumption rebuttable). Cf. Richard A. Posner,
Statutory Interpretation– In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811–
14 (1983) (critiquing cannons of statutory construction that “impute omniscience to
Congress”).
32

568 U.S. at 475 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–369, pp. 31–32 (1995)).
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PSLRA,” the Court reasoned, by later enacting the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which preempted most state securities
class actions.33 Furthermore, the Court was persuaded by the fact that
Congress rejected a number of proposals to undo the fraud-on-themarket presumption endorsed in Basic, all “[w]hile taking these steps to
curb abusive securities-fraud lawsuits.”34 For the Court, this all amounted
to both Congressional approval of both the Basic presumption and a
reason to reject calls to “reinterpret[] Rule 23.”35
The Court’s hesitancy to make changes in the securities litigation
context stands in sharp contrast to the judicial procedural innovation in a
host of other areas, such as in general pleadings standards, discovery, class
actions. Notably, Congress has either failed to act in these areas, or only
acted in incremental ways. I will use class certification standards as an
example.
As noted, the Supreme Court has, over several cases, made it
harder for plaintiffs to bring class action lawsuits. Beginning in 2011, the
Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes precluded all but “incidental”
damages in (b)(2) class actions and raised the standard for commonality in
all class actions, requiring not just a single “common question,” but a
“common contention” that will “resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.36 That same year, the
Court upheld arbitration and class action waiver clauses in AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, finding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted
California state law classifying most class arbitration waivers as
unconscionable.37 Two years later in 2013, the Court made it more
difficult to bring Rule 23(b)(3) claims in cases in which there are questions
about the ability of damages to be measured on a class wide basis.38
33

Id. at 476 (citing 112 Stat. 322).

34

Id. at 476.

35

Id. at 477.

36

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011).

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); see also Spokeo v. Robins,
136 S.Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (holding that mere statutory violations did not equate to
cognizable real-world harm).

37

Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013). For an analysis of the Court’s trend
restricting class actions, see Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the
Decline, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 971 (2017).

38
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By contrast, Congress has attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to
change the class action certification requirements numerous times. For
example, the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017 (FICALA),
which passed the House but not the Senate in 2017, would have restricted
class actions in a number of ways, including by limiting fees in class actions
to a percentage of money actually distributed to the class and adopting a
class ascertainability standard.39 Similar measures exist in previous failed
proposals, such in the Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering
Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2016.40
What does all of this show? First, in a broad sense, the Court is
quite willing to address the problem of frivolous litigation. It has acted
though cases like Wal-mart and Comcast to further this goal.41 The Court’s
choice to further such a policy should not come as a surprise, as two of
the three principles embodied in the Federal Rules governing the judiciary
are “speed” and lack of expense (the third being “just” resolution of
actions).42
Second, and by contrast, in the securities litigation context, the
Court shows reluctance to address the same problem, specifically citing
Congressional action in the area. As the Court explained in Amgen,
“[b]ecause Congress has homed in on the precise policy concerns raised”
by Amgen, “’[w]e do not think it appropriate for the judiciary to make its
own further adjustments by reinterpreting Rule 23 to make likely success
on the merits essential to class certification in securities-fraud suits,’”43
Thus, at least in the context of aggregate litigation and the perceived
problem of frivolous litigation, the Court appears reluctant to utilize its

Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act
of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong., at § 105 (2017) (as passed by the House on Mar. 9,
2017).
39

Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act
of 2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016)

40

Coffee, supra note 11, at 135 (explaining that the Court in Wal-mart impliedly
addressed the problem of the theory of extortion, or the fact that “inevitable
aggregation of strong individual cases with weak cases in a class action may give
enhanced (and unjustified) settlement value to weak claims”).

41

42

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

43

Amgen, 568 U.S. at 477.
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inherent procedural rulemaking role, at least when Congress has itself
considered the problem, and thus “covered the field.”
Robert Klonoff, in his article reviewing developments in class
action jurisprudence, has suggested that in cases like Amgen, the Supreme
Court may be pulling back on its class action reform stance and rejecting
the “mantra” that class actions class actions inevitably lead to “blackmail
settlements” induced by “intense pressure to settle”).44 While this may be
true, it may also be that the Court is selectively choosing the contexts in
which it is willing to engage in the frivolous litigation debate. We may
soon have an answer to this quandary, as the Court is soon expected to
issue a decision in Frank v. Gaos, which concerns when courts may approve
class action settlements that distribute portions of proceeds to third
parties.45 As Congress has specifically chosen not to act on the cy pres
issue46 (thus, theoretically, leaving the “field” open), it will be interesting
to see if the Court does.
If judicial procedural innovation is being stalled by targeted
Congressional procedural efforts, one might also wonder if any potential
change in the area of securities litigation will happen some other way. As
Richard Marcus has said, “One seeming constant is the urge to reform.”47
One answer could be through parties and interest groups.48 These groups
may be emboldened and mobilized by targeted Congressional reform like
the PSLRA, and thus could be uniquely able to affect future procedural
reform, either through further legislative change, lobbying for federal rules
changes, or litigation advocacy.49 Another possibility is that other
44

See Klonoff, supra note 39, at 980-82.

Ronald Mann, Argument analysis: Justices skeptical of “cy pres” class-action
settlements, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 1, 2018, 1:28 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-justices-skeptical-of-cy-presclass-action-settlements/
45

Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong., at § 1718
(2017) (as passed by the House on Mar. 9, 2017).

46

Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
157, 185 (2008).

47

48 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 922-26 (1999) (describing the role of
interest groups in the public choice problems that arise in rulemaking).

Id. at 904 & nn. 60, 175-97 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying in the
rulemaking process).

49
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institutions might pick up the baton, taking on the role of reform in the
area. As an example, SEC Commissioner Jay Clayton announced in April
2018 that the SEC had begun reviewing its rule prohibiting mandatory
arbitration in corporate by-laws.50 According to John Coffee, such a move
would “effectively preclude” securities class actions.51
Ultimately, this Comment cannot fully answer the question
regarding the institutional effects of targeted Congressional rulemaking
on the procedural rulemaking choices of the judiciary.52 However, it is
hoped that the examples described here and in Prof. Lipton’s Essay will
shed further light on Congress’s role in the current development of
securities class actions in the courts, and in judicial procedural rulemaking
more broadly. Sarah Staszak, a leading institutional scholar focusing on
access to courts, posited that, “[i]n a complex governing arrangement
where institutions, each with their own entrenched interests, have to
negotiate how best to govern, institutional change (of any kind) must be
explained in an interbranch context.”53 That is certainly true of the change
wrought by Congress through the PSLRA.

Alison Frankel, SEC Chair Clayton is in no rush for mandatory shareholder arbitration,
REUTERS (April 27, 2018, 2:58 PM), (https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otcarbitration/sec-chair-clayton-is-in-no-rush-for-mandatory-shareholder-arbitrationidUSKBN1HY2QL).

50

51

Coffee, supra note 11, at 132.

52 See Bone, supra note 49 at 921 (1999) (arguing that greater involvement by Congress
in procedural rulemaking had resulted in concrete changes to the court-centered
rulemaking process); Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure: The Continuing Gloom About Federal
Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 447, 455 (2013) (explaining that “[b]ecause it acts
in the shadow of Congress—under the threat that those it disappoints can go to the
Capitol—the [Federal Rules] Committee may have an incentive to stay away from topics
that will push too many hot buttons” but “[i]t does so sporadically and unpredictably”).
53 Sarah Staszak, Realizing the Rights Revolution: Litigation and the American State, 38 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 222, 241 (2013).

